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ABSTRACT
Several non-experimental studies report that income inequality and other forms of population-based
heterogeneity reduce levels of trust in society.  However, recent work by Glaeser et al. (2000) calls
into question the reliability of widely used survey-based measures of trust.  Specifically, survey
responses regarding trust attitudes did not reflect subjects’ actual behavior in a trust game.  In this
paper, we conduct a novel experimental test of the effects of inequality on trust and trustworthiness.
Our experimental design induces inequality by varying the show-up fees paid to subjects, in contrast
to previous experiments that focus on broad cultural or national differences in trust.  We do not find
robust support for the hypothesis that inequality per se dampens trusting behavior among all
subjects; however, we do find some evidence that trust and trustworthiness are influenced by an
individual’s relative position in the group.  Finally, we confirm previous findings that common
survey-based  measures of social trust are not associated with actual trusting behavior. 
JEL Codes: C9, Z13
Keywords: Trust, social capital, heterogeneity, inequality, experiment
1I.  Introduction
The level of trust in society has long been recognized as an important economic resource
(Arrow 1972); more recently, a plethora of empirical findings from across the social and behavioral
sciences suggest that social trust has a beneficial impact on a wide-range of economic, political and
social phenomena (e.g., Putnam 2000).  This burgeoning literature has in turn inspired several
studies of the determinants of trust.  A repeated finding from national and cross-national surveys is
that income inequality and other forms of population heterogeneity, especially race and ethnicity, are
associated with lower levels of trust (e.g., Alesina and La Ferarra 2002).  Theoretical explanations
for a causal link between inequality and trust differ, but most are behavioral (e.g., Wilkinson 1996).
While several recent experimental studies examine cultural or national differences in trusting and
trustworthy behavior (e.g., Koford 2001), to date the experimental literature has not addressed the
question of whether inequality itself affects trust.  In addition, a recent study by Glaeser et al. (2000),
which combines survey and experimental methods, raises serious doubts about whether the survey-
based measures of trust employed in much of the non-experimental literature actually reflect trusting
behavior.
 We conduct a novel test of the hypothesis that group heterogeneity reduces trust by varying
the show-up fees paid for participation in the experiment; this does not affect the equilibrium in the
trust game, but it does generate a focal source of heterogeneity among our subjects.  In addition, in
some of our experiments, we award show-up fees in a public ceremony in order to heighten the
salience of this source of inequality.  We analyze the effects of this inequality treatment on both
trusting and trustworthy behavior in the experimental setting.  Further, in contrast to the previous
literature on inequality and trust, we also investigate whether group-based measures of inequality
2versus individual measures of relative standing are better predictors of subject behavior.  Finally, like
Glaeser et al., we also administer surveys to our subjects; this allows us to examine the association
between actual trusting behavior in the lab and self-reported trusting attitudes and experiences.
Our subsequent analysis provides some weak evidence that group-based measures of induced
inequality reduce both trust and trustworthiness, that is, until we control for relative standing of
individuals via a “relative deprivation index.”  In fact, we find that relative deprivation is
significantly associated with lower levels of trustworthiness; this is noteworthy, since the non-
experimental literature on trust has ignored both trustworthiness and measures of relative standing.
In addition, we find little support for claims that either attitudinal or behavioral-based survey
measures of trust predict trusting or trustworthy behavior in our experiments.  These findings
accentuate the doubts raised by Glaeser et al. about the reliability of survey-based measures
employed in most non-experimental studies of trust.
In Sections II and III we review the non-experimental literature on heterogeneity and trust
and the relevant experimental literature, respectively.  Section IV describes the experiment; our
analysis and results are presented in Section V.  We conclude with a discussion of our findings and
suggestions for further research.
II.  Non-Experimental Studies Linking Trust and Inequality
Several prominent authors argue that trust reduces the transaction costs of economic activity
and facilitates the realization of collective goals (e.g., Arrow 1972, Coleman 1990, Fukuyama 1995
and Putnam 2000).  Consistent with these claims, numerous empirical studies report that survey
measures of social trust can be used to predict a host of phenomena, from economic growth (Knack
3and Keefer 1997, and Zak and Knack 2001) and political corruption (La Porta et al. 1999) across
countries, to population health (Kawachi et al. 1998) and crime (Kennedy et al. 1998 ) across U.S.
states.  In light of such findings, social scientists have begun to investigate the factors that produce
differences in trust across countries, states, or individuals.
Several theories suggest that population heterogeneity reduces trust.  For example, Alesina
and La Ferarra (2002) posit a general aversion to heterogeneity among individuals that serves to
increase the transaction costs of social experiences with members of other groups; likewise, Coleman
(1990) and Barr (1999) argue that “familiarity breeds trust.”  Other explanations rely on the
psychology of envy, or even evolutionary biology (e.g., see Wilkinson 1996 and Zak and Knack
2001).  However, tests of these theories require that researchers have some meaningful way to
quantify individual or group trust.
Empirical studies of  trust typically make use of survey data from sources such as the General
Social Survey (GSS), the World Values Survey (WVS) or the International Social Survey Program
(ISSP).  Survey respondents are classified as trusting or not according to their answers to questions
about whether in general, “most people can be trusted.”  Aggregating these responses into measures
of “generalized trust,” several authors note a strong negative association between trust and income
inequality across countries (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997 and Knack 2003) and across U.S. states
(e.g., Putnam 2000).  Of course, such ecological analyses may not accurately reflect causal processes
at the individual-level.  However, more recent work that analyzes individual survey responses
confirms this finding.
Both Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Costa and Kahn (2003) use the GSS to estimate
models of individual trust as a function of individual attributes and metropolitan area characteristics,
  One exception is Leigh’s (2003) analysis of individual trust in Australia; he does not find that2
neighborhood inequality reduces trust.  However, Leigh does not control for individual income, so
this study is not comparable to those cited in the text. 
  For example, two recent studies (Eibner and Evans (forthcoming) and Wagstaff and van Doorslaer3
2000) attempt to distinguish between the consequences of group inequality versus relative
deprivation on the health of individuals.
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while Leigh (2004) exploits WVS and ISSP data to estimate individual trust as a function of
individual attributes and country-level characteristics.  In each case, the probability that an individual
responds that “most people can be trusted” is positively associated with own income and education,
but negatively associated with income inequality.  These same studies also suggest that sources of
population heterogeneity, in addition to income inequality, reduce the propensity of individuals to
express faith in the trustworthiness of others.  Racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation
are also negatively associated with individual trust – at least in some specifications, and albeit not
necessarily so when multiple measures of population heterogeneity are included simultaneously in
these models.  Nevertheless, there appears to be an emerging consensus that population heterogeneity
in general (and income inequality in particular) reduces social trust.2
Despite the recent attention to the relationship between income inequality and trust, these
studies are silent on two points.  First, all of the studies cited above employ the gini coefficient as
the only measure of income inequality.  None of these studies explore whether it is in fact group-
based measures of inequality that matter versus an individual’s relative standing within an unequal
community.   In other words, controlling for absolute income, does inequality have a differential3
effect on the trust of the haves versus the have nots?  Second, if inequality influences one member’s
perceptions of the trustworthiness of others in their group, shouldn’t inequality also have some effect
on that individual’s own trustworthiness?  Yet, we know of no empirical evidence regarding the
  This analysis applies to a one-shot game, but can also be extended to a repeated game with a4
known endpoint. 
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effects of income inequality on either self-reported trustworthiness or trustworthy behavior.
A very different sort of criticism of the trust literature is found in Glaeser et al. (2000); these
authors integrate survey and experimental data to demonstrate that “generalized trust” is not
significantly associated with trusting behavior in laboratory experiments.  This disconnect calls into
question much of the non-experimental evidence on inequality and trust, since the dependent
variables in those studies may bear no relationship to actual trusting behavior.  For this reason, we
induce heterogeneity among our experimental subjects in order to conduct a novel test of whether
inequality influences trusting behavior in the experimental lab.
III.  Experimental Studies of Trust
Before describing our experimental design, we first provide a brief overview of the classic
trust game, also known as the investment game.  The first experiment to explicitly study trust was
designed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (hereafter, BDM 1995).  In this game, one subject (the first
mover) is given some amount of money and offered the opportunity to pass some, all or none to a
partner (the second mover).  All passed money is multiplied by some predetermined amount before
being received by the second mover.  Finally, the second mover has the opportunity to pass some,
all or none of the money she receives back to the first mover.  Using backward induction, it is
straightforward to show that the Nash equilibrium for this game is that no money will be passed in
the first stage since second movers have no incentive to return money in the second stage.  4
The original BDM (1995) trust experiment revealed that game theory does not predict actual
behavior in this environment.  On average, first movers sent around half of their endowment ($5.16
  An excellent source for other experimental trust studies is Ostrom and Walker (2003).5
  Many cross-cultural studies using different experiments also find insignificant differences in6
behavior (e.g., Roth et al. 1991).
  See, for example, Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo (2004a, b).7
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out of $10) to their second-mover partner.  Second movers returned around one-third of what they
received ($4.66 out of $15.48).  Subsequent studies have reported some variation in the amounts sent
and returned, but in general they confirm that the stark Nash equilibrium prediction does not hold
up in these games.   Considerable attention has been devoted to studying whether the difference5
between theory and behavior can be accounted for by culture, making the trust game one of the most
well-traveled economics experiments.  Trust experiments have been conducted in Belgium
(Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004), Brazil (Csukas et al.2003), Bulgaria (Koford 2001), China (Croson
and Buchan 1999 and Buchan and Croson 2004), France (Willinger et al. 2003), Germany (Fehr et
al. 2003 and Willinger et al. 2003), Greece  (Csukas et al. 2003), Hungary (Csukas et al. 2003), Israel
(Fershtman and Gneezy 2001), the Netherlands (Bellemare and Kroger 2003), Russia (Gächter,
Herrmann and Thöni 2003 and Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov 2003, Csukas et al. 2003), South Africa
(Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov 2003), Tanzania (Danielson and Holm 2004), Turkey (Bouckaert and
Dhaene 2002) and Zimbabwe (Barr 1999 and 2003).  While two papers report significant differences
in behavior across countries (Koford 2001 and Willinger et al. 2003), the majority of studies
conclude that cultural differences do not significantly influence behavior in the trust game.  6
We build on this literature by examining the effect of induced heterogeneity in a trust
experiment.  Heterogeneity that is induced in laboratory settings has been studied extensively in
other experiments, most notably in public goods games.   No experimental study has looked at the7
effects of similarly-induced heterogeneity on trust behavior, despite the evidence that inequality
7affects survey-based measures of trust.  Even in the rare cases in which cross-cultural differences
have been identified, they may be the combined result of political, social, and economic factors.  
A small number of trust experiments have looked at naturally-occurring heterogeneity in the
form of  pre-existing differences among subjects.  Glaeser et al. (2000) finds a small negative, but
statistically insignificant, effect on amount sent when players interacted face-to-face with a partner
of a different nationality.  This type of interaction also produced a negative, and in this case
significant, effect on the amount returned by second movers.  Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) conduct
a trust game with Israeli college students, in which subjects were told the last name of their partner
as a means of revealing their ethnicity.  In this study, significantly less money was transferred to
Eastern origin players by partners from both the East and the West, a finding that held for males but
not females.  Bouckaert and Dhaene (2002) conduct a similar experiment using businessman of
Turkish or Belgian origin, but they report no evidence of ethnic differences in the amount sent or
returned.  Finally, Willinger et al. (2003) pair French and German students and find no difference
in behavior when subjects knew they were playing with someone from a country other than their
own.  Thus, half of these studies provide evidence that heterogeneity in the players’ ethnicity or
national origin reduces trusting behavior.  In this study, we build on these earlier works by examining
the effect of heterogeneity in a readily-observed income measure, and by inducing heterogeneity
within a controlled laboratory setting.
IV.  Experimental Design
For each of twelve sessions we recruited eight subjects to participate in the trust game
established in BDM 1995. For each session of the experiment, subjects were recruited from
  Following BDM 1995, second movers were also given a $10 starting balance each round, but they8
could not return any of their $10 starting balance to their first-mover partner.  The $10 starting
balance for second movers was designed to prevent very small earnings for second movers and to
equalize earnings across roles in the experiment.
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undergraduate classes at the College of William and Mary and were randomly assigned to be a first
mover or a second mover in the game. Each subject participated in 30 decision-making rounds of
the game; in each round, the first mover received a new $10 starting balance and amounts passed to
the second mover were tripled.   Roles remained constant throughout the experimental session but8
subjects were randomly re-paired at the beginning of each new round.
Heterogeneity was introduced to this setup through the use of three different show-up
payment distributions as described in Table 1.  Each distribution was applied for a set of 10 rounds
in the game.  Giving subjects a fixed payment for showing up is a standard practice in many
experiments.  This payment supplements what subjects earn based on their decisions and serves as
a lower bound on their compensation for participating in the experiment.  In two cases, which we
refer to as “skewed” and “symmetric,” show-up payments varied across participants; in the
“egalitarian” treatment, all subjects received an identical payment.   All distributions had an average
payment of $7.50.  
In Table 1, the “type of inequality” treatment refers to the manner in which fixed payments
were assigned to participants.  In the private treatment, all subjects were told the distribution of fixed
payments, but were privately given a card with their specific fixed payment written on it. In the
public treatment, the fixed payments were awarded in a “ceremony.”  When the payments varied,
each subject’s name was recorded on a card and placed in a container.  All subjects watched as we
drew one name from the container and awarded that person the highest fixed payment.  The
remaining fixed payments were awarded in a similar manner, starting with the second highest and
9finishing with the lowest.  This type of ceremony is similar to one used by Ball et al. (2001), which
examined status effects on market interaction.
Starting with Glaeser et al. (2000), a number of trust experiments have been paired with
surveys to measure the predictive power of the standard questions used to gauge trust and
trustworthiness.  We adopt this approach as well.  In some studies subjects are surveyed prior to the
experiment and in other studies, at the conclusion of the session.  The advantage of conducting the
survey first is that an individual’s survey responses will not be influenced by her experiences in the
experiment.  A disadvantage is that survey responses might influence behavior in the experiment.
For example, a subject who strongly agrees with the statement  “I am trustworthy” might feel
compelled to return a large amount of money as a second mover.  In comparing correlations between
behavior and survey responses across both types of paired studies, we were unable to identify any
obvious order effect, but as we later discuss, these studies differ in multiple dimensions.  Since our
primary focus is on how heterogeneity affects behavior in the trust experiment, we conducted the
survey at the end of the experiment.  Thus, any biases caused by the pairing would be less likely to
affect actual behavior, rather than survey responses, which are only one feature of our analysis.  We
describe the survey questions in more detail later in the paper.
V.  Results 
The results from the experiment are presented below in three parts.  First, we discuss our
empirical examination of trust, as indicated by first-mover decisions regarding the amount sent.  This
is followed by an analysis of trustworthiness, measured by the ratio of the amount returned to the
amount available to return by second movers.  These analyses employ descriptive statistics and a
10
series of regression models that control for the repeated nature of the game and subject fixed effects.
In a third section, we turn our attention to assessing the relationship between both of these subject
behaviors and the trusting attitudes and experiences elicited by our survey.
A.  Inequality and Trust
Across all twelve sessions and 30 decision-making periods, first movers sent an average of
$4.97 (out of $10) to their randomly-matched partners.  The mean amount sent is somewhat lower
in the sessions in which the fixed payments were distributed in a less public manner, at $4.41,
compared to an average of $5.53 in sessions that used a public ceremony to award fixed payments.
A rank-sum test reveals that the difference in means is not significant at conventional levels
(p=0.152), however, in the skewed treatment there is a significant difference in the amount sent in
public versus private inequality (p=0.05).  We adopt the use of separate samples in our subsequent
analysis to identify whether the public nature of the award ceremony influenced the effects of other
experimental conditions on behavior.  For ease of discussion, we use the terms “private” and
“public” to reference the separate samples.
In Table 2, we present mean amounts sent by the type of inequality treatment induced in the
experiment.  As shown on the left-hand side of the bottom row (for the private sessions), mean
amount sent is greater in the egalitarian treatment than in either of the two unequal treatments.  This
is consistent with survey-based evidence that heterogeneity reduces the level of trust.  However,
these differences are not significant according to Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, and a similar pattern is
not found in the public sessions.  Table 2 also reports mean amount sent by the subject’s fixed
payment within the inequality treatments.  In both private and public sessions, the amount sent is
largest among subjects who received the median payment in the symmetric distributions.  In the
  Anderhub, Engelmann, and Güth (2002) and Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2003) also conduct9
repeated trust games; these games differ in design from ours and thus the analysis of results is not
comparable.
  Since the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 10, some econometric analyses of trust games have10
employed Tobit models to address right- and left-censoring.  We estimated a series of random effects
Tobit models using STATA software, and as recommended, also checked the sensitivity of the
quadrature approximation used in the random-effects estimators.  The results of these checks
suggested that the random-effects Tobit should not be employed with our data set, possibly due to
the degree of correlation within subject observations.  Fixed effects can not be easily introduced to
the Tobit model, and GLS models with random effects were not appropriate as indicated by
Hausman tests.  For these reasons, we use fixed effects models.
11
skewed distributions, the highest paid subjects sent relatively less than other participants in the
private sessions, but relatively more in the public sessions. 
To test the separate effects of both the fixed payment level and its distribution on subject
behavior, we employ multivariate regressions on separate samples from the private and public
sessions.  For each sample, we start with 720 observations of amount sent, based on six sessions with
four first movers per session and 30 decisions per subject.   In our basic regression model, we define
the dependent variable as the amount sent in each round, and we use subject fixed effects to allow
for unobserved subject-specific differences in behavior.  Following Cochard, Van, and Willinger
(2004) who also model output from a repeated trust game, we control for the fraction returned by the
second mover in the previous round.    For cases in which the first mover sent nothing in the9
previous round, we code the fraction returned in the previous round as 0 and include a dummy
variable to pick up this effect.  This requires omitting the initial round of play for all subjects, and
results in two samples of 696 observations.  We include a set of 28 dummy variables to control for
the round of play, with the second round serving as the omitted category.  To this set of explanatory
variables, we sequentially add measures of the fixed payment and the type of inequality.
Table 3 reports the results of several fixed effects models of amount sent.    As shown in the10
12
first two rows of the table, the amount sent in a given round increases with the fraction returned from
the matched partner in the previous round, and decreases when subjects sent nothing in the previous
round.  Although not shown here, the coefficients of the round dummies are largely insignificant
individually, but are jointly significant at the 0.01 level or better in each model. 
Before discussing the effects of the inequality treatments, we first examine the effect of the
fixed payment itself on trust behavior.  As shown in columns (1) - (3), larger payments reduce the
amount sent in the private sample; however, data from the public sessions in columns (4) - (6) report
the opposite relationship.  In the survey-based literature on trust, several studies report that trusting
attitudes are positively associated with income and years of schooling among individuals (e.g.,
Alesina and La Ferrara 2002), and GDP across countries (e.g., Zak and Knack 2001).  Thus, our
public sample findings are consistent with this type of income effect.   Our finding in the private
sample is more consistent with an entitlement effect as described in Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000), who
find that when first movers performed a task to earn their role in the trust game they were more likely
to send nothing to their second-mover partners.  Perhaps when high payments are received privately,
the sense of entitlement reduces what subjects send to their partners.  Alternatively, the public
revelation of a high fixed payment might “shame” the recipients into sending more. 
 To the base model, we next add controls for the presence of inequality; results are reported
in columns (2) and (4).  Dummy variables are used to indicate when decisions were made during a
skewed or symmetric fixed payment distribution; the omitted category is when all subjects in the
group received an equal payment.  In the private sample, we see some indication that  heterogeneity
introduced in the experiment had a dampening effect on trust behavior: the amount sent is
significantly lower in both symmetric and skewed distributions relative to egalitarian.  However, this
  Following Deaton (2001), we calculate this index for person i as:11
i iwhere x  is the fixed payment for individual i, [1 - F(x )] is the proportion of the subjects in the
i isession with payments greater than x , : (x ) is the mean of all payments to subjects with payments+
i rgreater than x , and :  is the mean of all payments in the session. 
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pattern is not observed in the public sessions, where respondents in the skewed treatment sent
significantly more than those in the egalitarian treatment.  
We next seek to determine whether these significant effects of inequality are the result of
heterogeneity per se, versus the subject’s relative position in the group.  Previous studies of
individual trust report that group-based measures of heterogeneity, such as income inequality, racial
fragmentation, and linguistic fractionalization are associated with lower levels of trust among
individuals (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, and Leigh 2004).  It is also possible that heterogeneity
affects trust for certain group members more so than others.   For example, Leigh (2003) examines
the effects of inequality separately in samples of rich and poor individuals, but reports that inequality
has similar effects on trust in both groups.  
We test whether the effect of inequality is due to differences in relative ranking, and whether
those at the bottom of the distribution are most affected by those differences.  This distinction is of
particular relevance to the trust game, where individual payoffs are based on decisions made between
one person and her partner, as opposed to the group’s actions overall.  For this reason, we add a
subject-specific measure of relative income to the model, the relative deprivation index (RDI).11
Values of the RDI can range from 0 to 1, with higher values assigned to subjects who are more
deprived relative to their group members.  In our experiment, the RDI ranged from a low of 0
  In a variation of model (3) that does not include the two distribution dummies as explanatory12
variables, the coefficient on RDI is negative and significant at the .01 level.   However, an F-test on
model (3) shows that the distribution dummies are jointly significant at the 0.01 level.
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(assigned to subjects who receive the largest fixed payment in the group and all subjects in the
egalitarian distribution) to a high of 0.53 (assigned to subjects who received a $4 fixed payment in
the skewed distribution).  
When we include this measure in the model in the private sample (column 3), we find that
the coefficients on the inequality treatment variables are no longer significant, whereas the RDI has
a large negative coefficient.   This suggests that the more deprived members of the group were less
trusting, however, this effect is not statistically significant.   Moreover, in the public sample, none12
of the coefficients for either inequality treatment or the individual’s relative placement is statistically
significant in column (6).
In summary, our analysis of amount sent suggests that the presence of heterogeneity in the
fixed payments had a statistically significant negative effect on trust in some sessions, specifically
when fixed payment awards were made privately.  When we added controls to the model for the
subject’s relative position in the distribution, we found that the inequality effect was driven by
subjects who received low payments relative to their group members.  These subjects were less
trusting, but this effect was not statistically significant.  These findings add to a number of previous
studies on the determinants of trust by highlighting the contribution of heterogeneity, and identifying
the importance of the individual’s relative position in the group.  We now turn to the data on second-
mover behavior. 
B.  Inequality and Trustworthiness
The decision of interest for second movers in our experiment is the return ratio, defined as
  The difference in means is not significant, but mirroring our analysis of trust we examine the13
samples separately.  This also allows the effects of inequality and other controls to differ across the
two samples.
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the amount returned divided by three times the amount sent.  For the combined twelve sessions, the
return ratio has a mean of 0.355; the mean is slightly higher in the public sessions at 0.377 compared
to 0.330 in the private sessions.   Mean values of return ratio by inequality treatment and fixed13
payment are shown in Table 4.  Examining values in the bottom row, there does not appear to be a
consistent relationship between the type of inequality and mean levels of trustworthiness.  In the
private sessions, return ratio is greatest in the symmetric treatment, and in the public sessions, it is
largest (but barely so) in the egalitarian treatment. 
As we did for the analysis of amount sent, we also estimate a series of multivariate regression
models to separately identify the effects of various aspects of the experimental design.  We use fixed
effects regressions of the return ratio on the amount sent and a set of round dummy variables.  We
then add controls sequentially for the fixed payment, distribution dummies, and the RDI.  The results
are presented in Table 5; because we do not observe a value for return ratio when nothing was sent
by a first mover, these samples are smaller than those used to estimate the models of amount sent.
One explanatory variable consistently and significantly associated with the return ratio is the
amount sent by the first mover.  In all models, receiving a larger amount from the first mover leads
to an increase in the return ratio.  In every case, the fixed payment has a negative effect on the return
ratio, but in only two cases is the effect significant.  While none of the inequality variables is
significant in the private sessions, column (5) reports a negative and significant coefficient for the
symmetric distribution dummy in the public sessions.  When we subsequently control for the
subject’s relative payment in column (6), we find a negative and significant effect for the subject-
  Specifically, of 12 attitudinal questions used by Glaeser et al. only two had significant effects on14
trust behavior, and both of these questions pertained to trust in strangers, a narrowly-defined group.
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specific inequality, but no negative effect for either group inequality measure.  This suggests that
subjects who receive relatively small fixed payments, all else equal, return less to their partners, or,
in other words, are less trustworthy.  In column (6), the skewed distribution dummy is instead
positive and significant.  Recall that in the skewed session, first movers with the highest payments
sent significantly more to their partners, an effect that could lead second movers in the skewed
treatment to reciprocate with larger percentage returns.  
In summary, the results from models of return ratio provide some limited evidence that
heterogeneity in the subjects’ payments reduced trustworthiness.  Specifically, in the public sessions
we found a significant negative effect for the symmetric inequality treatment variable.  However,
when we added the RDI variable to the model, the effects of group-level inequality were no longer
negative, and instead we found that the subjects with relatively low fixed payments returned less to
their partners.  This evidence adds to existing findings from survey-based studies of heterogeneity
and trust; to date such studies have not examined heterogeneity as a determinant of trustworthiness.
C.  Analysis of Trust Survey Questions
As we noted earlier, subjects completed a survey at the end of each experimental session. 
The survey included a number of questions designed to elicit trusting attitudes and behaviors, and
several recent papers have paired these types of questions with trust experiments to gauge their
validity.  The first study to do this, Glaeser et al. (2000), produced several interesting findings.  First,
questions regarding subjects’ general trust in others, and about the perceived helpfulness or fairness
of others (so-called attitudinal questions) were found to have no significant effect on trust behavior.14
In contrast, survey questions about past trusting acts (like leaving doors unlocked and loaning money
  The paired studies include Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2003), Bellemare and Kroger (2003),15
Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogan (2003), Csukas et al. (2003),  Danielson and Holm (2004), and
Fehr et al. (2003).
  Both Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogan (2003) and Fehr et al. (2003) reported that several16
measures based on generalized trust did not have significant associations with the second mover’s
transfer.  However an important difference between these studies and the others is that models of
second-mover transfers included several different measures of trust attitudes.  It is possible that the
degree of correlation between these measures led to multicollinearity and insignificant coefficients.
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to others) were significantly associated with trusting behavior in the experiment.  Another reported
finding from the Glaeser et al. study is that attitudinal measures of trust were significantly associated
with trustworthiness (measured by the return ratio).
Subsequent studies that have paired the trust game with a survey have produced mixed
results.   For example, both Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2003) and Danielson and Holm (2004)15
were able to replicate the Glaeser et al. finding  that generalized trust was not significantly associated
with amount sent.  In contrast, Bellemare and Kroger (2004) found that generalized trust had a
positive and significant association with trusting behavior.  As for the use of questions about past
behaviors, Danielson and Holm (2004) found that a trusting behavior index had no effect on the
amount sent, a result that differs from Glaeser et al.  Thus, there is no consensus about which survey
questions best predict trusting behavior.   However, one finding that has been reproduced in most
subsequent work is that questions about trust predict trustworthiness.  Five of these seven paired
studies have reported that variables measuring generalized trust were positively and significantly
related to the percent returned by the second mover.   16
The mixed nature of results from paired studies is perhaps not surprising given the variation
in the study designs.  Some studies conduct the survey before the experiment, others after, and one
study simultaneously conducted  the survey and the experiment.  The experimental designs vary in
  In some cases, second movers responded to the actual amount send by their first-mover partners.17
In others, the “strategy method” was used.  This required second movers to report return amounts
for every possible amount that a first mover might send. 
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other important ways, such as the number of decisions made (one-shot versus repeated) and the
method for assessing second-mover responses.   Like trust experiments in general, these paired17
studies also have considerable variation across subject pools, with a mix of student and non-student
subjects from Brazil, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Russia, South Africa, Tanzania, and the
United States.  Studies also vary greatly in terms of the use and wording of specific survey questions,
and the way in which they were entered in the model (ie., as dummy variables or indexes).  For these
reasons, direct comparisons are difficult. Nonetheless, the debate continues about the importance of
these pre-existing attitudes or tendencies in subject decisions. 
From a series of common questions eliciting attitudes and experiences involving trust, we
constructed eleven variables including several measures of general trust (e.g., agreeing that most
people can be trusted) and several indicators of trusting behaviors (e.g., leaving doors unlocked). 
Table 6 lists the eleven trust variables and their means in samples of first and second movers.  In the
first half of the table, we include each of these measures in a separate regression of amount sent with
controls for round dummies, whether nothing was sent in the last round, what fraction was returned
in the last round, as well as subject race and gender.  Because the trust survey variables were fixed
for each respondent, we estimated OLS models with clustered standard errors in lieu of fixed effects.
Separate columns report regression coefficients for the relevant trust variable in the private and
public samples.   In all but three cases, we find no significant relationship between trust responses
in the survey and trusting behavior in our experiment.  One of the three significant cases is
incorrectly-signed: self-reported trustworthiness is associated with lower amounts sent in the public
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sessions.  Only the variables measuring perceived fairness and not having a loan repaid have
significant effects in the expected direction.  
We examine the association of trust responses with trustworthiness, or the fraction returned
by second movers, in the second half of Table 6.  These regressions include controls for round
dummies, the amount sent, and the race and gender of the subject.  Here, we find only one instance
where a coefficient is statistically significant, and in that case, the direction of the effect is opposite
the expected sign.  However, in spite of their statistical insignificance, the majority of the
coefficients in Table 6 do have the expected sign (29 of 43 models).
D.  Sensitivity Tests
Recall that in our experiment, subjects made ten decisions in each of three different
inequality treatments, skewed, symmetric, and egalitarian.  This feature allows us to use within-
subject variation to identify the effects of inequality on behavior, and to attribute any observed effect
to the inequality treatments, as opposed to unobservable characteristics of the subjects who
participated in the particular treatments.  However, it is possible that subject experiences under one
inequality treatment may have had persistent effects on subject behavior under subsequent
treatments.  For this reason, we also conduct separate analyses using decisions from the first ten
rounds of the experiment during which subjects experienced only the initial distribution of show-up
fees.  We estimated the models in Tables 3 and 5 using approximately one-third of the observations,
and using clustered-OLS models in lieu of subject fixed effects (since the inequality variables were
fixed over the subjects’ first ten decisions).  The results of this exercise conform with our full-sample
findings, in that we do not find robust support for the hypothesis that inequality per se dampens
either type of trusting behavior, and we find some evidence that behavior is influenced by the
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subject’s relative deprivation.  In addition, the survey-based  measures of social trust are generally
not significantly associated with actual trusting behavior.   
Finally, we checked the sensitivity of our results to an alternate measure of the subject’s
relative ranking in the group, defined as the subject’s payment divided by the maximum payment
within the distribution.  The basic pattern of results shown in the full models reported in Tables 3
and 5 is unchanged.  For example, controlling for relative payment attenuates the negative effect of
inequality on amount sent in the private sessions, and subjects who received low payments relative
to the maximum were less trustworthy in the public sessions.
VI.  Conclusion
There is a growing non-experimental literature linking income inequality and other forms of
heterogeneity to lower levels of trust.  However, this literature has focused exclusively on the
common effects of group-based measures of inequality (i.e., the gini coefficient) on individual trust,
while ignoring individual-based measures of relative standing.  In a novel test of the importance of
induced inequality, we find that inequality has a significant effect on trusting behavior, but the effect
is negative only when fixed payments are awarded privately.  This negative association is largely
attenuated once we control for relative deprivation.  In addition, when we examine second-mover
behavior, salient inequality is weakly and positively associated with trustworthiness, while relative
deprivation has a strong depressing influence on trustworthiness.  These findings strongly suggest
that future research should investigate the role of relative standing in determining both trust and
trustworthiness.
These results contrast somewhat with our earlier work (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2004a)
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which examines the effect of group inequality on contributions in a public goods experiment.  In that
study, the effect of inequality was robust to the inclusion of relative deprivation as a control variable.
We suspect that the group nature of the public goods game, in contrast to the bilateral trust game,
makes group attributes more important in determining behavior.  However, in both experimental
settings, inequality seems to have a more pronounced effect in the public treatment; this suggests that
in order to induce heterogeneity in the lab, researchers should take pains to ensure that subjects find
such differences to be salient.  Nevertheless, the differential effect of inequality across these
experimental games also merits further study.
Several additional findings in our trust experiments should be noted.  First, we observe
several differences in subject behavior in the private versus public information treatments.  For
example, public information on the identities of individual “haves” and “have-nots” is associated
with both an increase in amounts sent (i.e., trust) and the fraction returned (i.e., trustworthiness);
however, the size of the fixed payment is negatively associated with amounts sent on the private
sessions and positively associated in the public sessions.  Future work should  explore to what extent
the public nature of these awards influences risk-taking and inequality aversion.  Further, relative
deprivation appears to be a significant determinant of trustworthiness, but not trust.  This is
consistent with other studies that uncover systematic differences in the determinants of trust versus
trustworthy behavior in similar experiments.
Our final set of results is perhaps the most troubling for the extant literature on the causes
and consequences of social trust.  We confirm Glaeser et al.’s finding that the most common
attitudinal measures of social trust (e.g., “most people can be trusted,” etc.) are not strongly
associated with trusting or trustworthy behavior by our experimental subjects.  However, like those
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authors, we do observe that attitudinal measures of trust tend to be positively correlated with
trustworthiness.  However, in contrast to Glaeser et al., we do not find that behavioral-based survey
measures of trust (e.g., “do you lock your door?”) fare any better in predicting trust or
trustworthiness.  Once again, these findings are in contrast to our public goods experiments
(Anderson, Mellor, Milyo 2004b); in those experiments, we find that both attitudinal and behavioral
survey measures are positively associated with contributions.  Nevertheless, given the extent to
which non-experimental studies of trust rely on survey-based measures of social trust, more attention
needs to be devoted to developing more reliable survey instruments for eliciting information on trust.
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Table 1. Experimental Design
Sessions Block 1
(10 rounds)
Block 2
(10 rounds)
Block 3
(10 rounds)
Type of
Inequality
Number of
Subjects
1 – 2 Egalitarian Skewed Symmetric Private 16
3 – 4 Skewed Symmetric Egalitarian Private 16
5 – 6 Symmetric Egalitarian Skewed Private 16
7 – 8 Egalitarian Skewed Symmetric Public 16
9 – 10 Skewed Symmetric Egalitarian Public 16
11 – 12 Symmetric Egalitarian Skewed Public 16
Total Subjects 96
Notes: Egalitarian show-up payments = (8 @ $7.50)
           Skewed show-up payments = (1 @ $20, 4 @ $7, 3 @ $4)
           Symmetric show-up payments = (3 @ $10, 2 @ $7.50, 3 @ $5)
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Table 2. Mean Amount Sent, By Inequality Treatment
Fixed
Payment
Private Public
Egalitarian Symmetric Skewed Egalitarian Symmetric Skewed
$4 4.34  4.77
$5 3.63 3.60
$7  4.18 6.41
$7.50  4.99 4.74  5.41 7.25
$10 4.01  5.59
$20   3.80 7.14
All 4.99 4.04 4.19 5.41 5.27 5.92
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Table 3.  Results of Fixed Effects Models of Amount Sent, With Inequality Treatments
Private
(n=696)
Public
(n=696)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fraction
Returned
Last Round
2.881***
(6.51)
2.880***
(6.55)
2.886***
(6.57)
3.226***
(7.27)
3.200***
(7.22)
3.194***
(7.21)
Sent Zero
Last Round
-1.257***
(3.86)
-1.204***
(3.73)
-1.189***
(3.68)
-1.222***
(3.24)
-1.199***
(3.19)
-1.191**
(3.17)
Fixed
Payment
-0.092*
(2.26)
-0.085*
(2.10)
-0.173*
(2.38)
0.082*
(2.39)
0.0769*
(2.25)
0.121*
(2.01)
Symmetric
Distribution
-0.869***
(3.84)
-0.456
(1.26)
-0.104
(0.48)
-0.315
(0.98)
Skewed
Distribution
-0.525*
(2.31)
0.277
(0.46)
0.417  ^
(1.91)
-0.006
(0.01)
RDI -2.482
(1.45)
1.269
(0.89)
Notes:   Absolute values of t-statistics reported in parentheses.   All models also include controls for round
of play.  Statistical significance indicated by  for the 0.001 level,  for the 0.01 level,  for the 0.05 level,*** ** *
and  for the 0.10 level.^
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Table 4.  Mean Return Ratio, By Inequality Treatment
Fixed
Payment
Private Public
Egalitarian Symmetric Skewed Egalitarian Symmetric Skewed
$4 0.297 0.361
$5 0.368 0.382
$7 0.337 0.417
$7.50 0.335 0.277 0.388 0.276
$10 0.395 0.410
$20 0.234 0.279
All 0.335 0.345 0.310 0.388 0.361 0.383
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Table 5.  Results of Fixed Effects Models of Return Ratio, With Inequality Treatments
Private
(n=551)
Public
(n=611)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Amount Sent 0.010**
(3.18)
0.010***
(3.32)
0.010***
(3.32)
0.007**
(2.59)
0.007**
(2.67)
0.007**
(2.68)
Fixed
Payment
-0.002
(0.61)
-0.002
(0.52)
 -0.001
(0.11)
-0.005
(1.58)
-0.005^
(1.71)
-0.020***
(3.73)
Symmetric
Distribution
0.022
(1.07)
0.017
(0.49)
-0.028^
(1.87)
0.034
(1.42)
Skewed
Distribution
-0.018
(0.85)
-0.026
(0.50)
-0.019
(1.28)
0.087*
(2.48)
RDI 0.025
(0.17)
-0.340***
(3.35)
Notes:   Absolute values of t-statistics reported in parentheses.  All models also include controls for round
of play.  Statistical significance indicated by  for the 0.001 level,  for the 0.01 level,  for the 0.05 level,*** ** *
and  for the 0.10 level.^
32
Table 6.  Models of Amount Sent and Return Ratio with Trust Survey Responses
Explanatory variable based
on subject’s survey response
that he or she:
Amount Sent Models Return Ratio Models
Mean
(Std.
Dev.)
Private Public Mean
(Std.
Dev.)
Private Public
$-hat $-hat $-hat $-hat 
Agrees that  “most people
can be trusted”
0.229
(0.425)
0.447
(0.49)
0.928
(0.57)
0.354
(0.483)
0.019
(0.31)
0.103
(1.25) 
Agrees that “most people try
to be fair”
0.292
(0.459)
1.591*
(2.60)
-0.099
(0.09)
0.292
(0.459)
0.049
(0.68)
0.121
(1.63)
Agrees that “most people try
to be helpful”
0.375
(0.489)
0.649
(1.01)
-1.140
(1.09)
0.333
(0.476)
-0.017
(0.22)
0.089
(1.19)
Strongly agrees/agrees that
“you can’t trust strangers
anymore”
0.604
(0.494)
0.840
(1.23)
-0.045
(0.04)
0.333
(0.476)
-0.041
(0.48)
-0.085
(1.06)
Strongly agrees/agrees that
 “I am trustworthy”
0.938
(0.245)
0.054
(0.08)
-2.628**
(3.59)
0.917
(0.279)
– -0.071
(0.62)
Often leaves door unlocked 0.292
(0.459)
0.596
(0.81)
1.121
(1.00)
0.438
(0.501)
0.009
(0.13)
0.036 
(0.45)
Has loaned money to
strangers 
0.25
(0.438)
-0.420
(0.83)
-0.430
(0.45)
0.313
(0.468)
-0.096^  
(1.68)
0.016
(0.25)
Often loans money or
possessions to friends
0.458
(0.504)
-0.237
(0.33)
0.978
(0.96)
0.625
(0.489)
0.007
(0.07)
0.056
(0.49)
Has loaned money to
someone who failed to
repay
0.813
(0.394)
-0.088
(0.13)
-1.846*
(2.49)
0.813
(0.394)
0.084
(0.69)
-0.069
(0.62)
Has been victim of a crime 0.458
(0.504)
-0.068
(0.11)
0.912
(0.94)
0.375
(0.489)
-0.040 
(0.61)
-0.060
(0.93)
Never lies to either parents,
friends, roommates, or other
acquaintances
0.542
(0.504)
0.484
(0.69)
0.478
(0.48)
0.532
(0.504)
-0.096
(1.34)
-0.060
(0.72)
Notes: Each survey-based explanatory variable was used in a separate OLS model that also included controls for subject
race (nonwhite) and gender (female), round of play.  Standard errors were clustered by subject.  In the amount sent
models we also controlled for the fraction return last round, and whether nothing was sent last round.  In the return ratio
models we also controlled for the amount sent.  Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   Means and
standard deviations of survey responses are based on a sample of subjects acting as either first or second  movers in all
sessions.   Amount sent regressions are based on samples of 696 observations, except for the regression reported in the
last row, where a missing response reduced the public session sample to 667 observations.  In the return ratio regressions,
the sample sizes of the private session were each 551 observations; in the public session samples included 611
observations, except for the regression reported in the last row, where a non- response reduced the sample to 582
observations.  In the case of the trustworthy variable, no coefficient is reported for the private sessions because the
variable took a value of 1 for all observations in that sample.
  In the public sessions, this sentence was replaced with “Hence, everyone in the room will know18
what the eight fixed payments are and who is randomly assigned each payment.” 
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Appendix:  General Instructions
This experiment is a study of individual behavior.  The instructions are simple.  If you follow
them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you privately
in cash at the end of the experiment today. 
Blocks and Rounds
In this experiment you will make a decision in each of 30 rounds. The specific details about
these decisions will be displayed on your computer screens and we will read these details aloud
before the decision-making rounds begin. The rounds will be divided into 3 blocks (A, B and C) with
10 decision-making rounds in each block.  Notice that the block and round indicators are shown on
the left side of your decision sheet.
Fixed Payment Cards
At the beginning of each block, we will shuffle and randomly distribute cards that assign your
“fixed payment” for that block. We have eight fixed payment cards for each block and the numbers
on those cards will be announced out loud and written on the board at the front of the room at the
beginning of each block. Hence, everyone in the room will know what the eight fixed payments are,
but only you will know which of the eight numbered cards was randomly distributed to you.  The18
number on your card represents your fixed payment for that block. For example, if you draw the 5,
your fixed payment is $5. Notice that there is only space for you to record one fixed payment amount
for each block because you are only given one fixed payment for each block. Your fixed payment
does not depend on decisions that you or other people make in this experiment. 
Your Earnings in the Experiment
The computer will keep a cumulative total of the money you earn for every decision you
make. Please disregard this amount, as it will not be relevant for your earnings. You should
transfer other requested information from the computer screen to your record sheet.  It will be
important in determining your earnings at the end of the experiment today. At the end of the
experiment, we will throw a 6-sided die to determine which block of rounds will be used to
determine your earnings. If we throw a 1 or 2, block A will be used; if we throw a 3 or 4, block B
will be used; and if we throw a 5 or 6, block C will be used. You will receive the fixed payment
associated with the block that we choose.  In addition, we will throw a 10-sided die to pick the
specific round within the chosen block that will determine your earnings in the decision-making
phase of the experiment. If the die throw is 1, we will use round 1, and so on. The die throws
guarantee that all rounds are equally likely to be chosen for payment, so you should think carefully
about each decision.
  These instructions are taken from Charles Holt’s VeconLab website at the University of Virginia19
(http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.htm)
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Appendix: Game Specific Instructions19
Rounds and Matchings: The experiment consists of a number of rounds. Note: In each round, you
will be matched with another person selected at random from the other participants. There will be
a new random rematching each round.
Interdependence: The decisions that you and the other person make will determine the amounts
earned by each of you. 
Pass/Keep Decisions: One of you will be designated to move first, and that person will begin by
receiving a specified amount of money $10.00. The first mover will decide how much money (if
any) to pass on to the other person and how much (if any) to keep. All money passed gets
multiplied by 3 before it is received by the second mover, who then decides how much (if any) to
keep and how much (if any) to pass back to the first mover. These pass/keep decisions determine
earnings for the round, as explained below.
Role: You have been randomly assigned to be a First Mover, and you will begin each round with
an amount of money, $10.00. You will decide how much to keep and how much to pass. 
OR Role: You have been randomly assigned to be a Second Mover. The other person (first
mover) will begin each round by receiving $10.00 and deciding how much to keep and how
much to pass.
Earnings from Pass/Keep Process: The first mover earns the amount kept initially plus the
amount that is passed back by the second mover. All money passed by the first mover is
multiplied by 3. The second mover earns the amount kept at this stage.
Matchings: At the beginning of each round, there will be a new random pairing of all
participants, so the person who you are matched with in one round may not be the same person
you will be matched with in the subsequent round. Matchings are random, and you are no more
likely to be matched with one person than with another.
Decisions: The first mover begins each round with $10.00 and must decide how much (if any) to
keep and how much (if any) to pass. What is passed gets tripled before being received by the
second mover. The second mover in each pair then decides how much (if any) to keep and how
much (if any) to pass back.
Earnings: The first mover earns the amount kept initially plus the amount passed back. The
second mover earns the amount kept in the second stage.
Rounds: There will be a number of rounds, with random rematchings in each one.
